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Nature of the Case 
Pursuant 
one count of 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
plea agreement, sixty-three-year-old 
abuse of a child age of sixteen 
\A/inn pleaded guilty to 
Mr. Winn later filed 
a motion to withdraw his guilty plea, which the district court denied. The district court 
subsequently imposed a unified sentence of twenty-five years, with twelve years fixed. 
On appeal, Winn asserts that the court abused its discretion when it denied 
the motion withdraw his guilty plea. Winn also that the district court 
abused its d when it imposed unified sentence of twenty-five years, with 
twelve years fixed, upon him following his plea of guilty. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
Garden City Police investigated allegations that Mr. Winn had sexually abused 
his granddaughter, J H. (Presentence Investigation Report (hereinafter, PSI), pp.2-3.) 1 
Mr. Winn's grandson, M.H., had reportedly disclosed seeing Mr. Winn sexually 
molesting J.H. (PSI, p.3.) During CARES interviews, both J.H. and M.H. reported that 
Mr. Winn had sexually abused J.H. (PSI, p.4.) 
Mr. Winn was interviewed about the allegations, and he stated that he had 
memory lapses due to using methamphetamine. (PSI, p.3.) He acknowledged that it 
was possible that he had touched J.H., but stated that drugs made him do things he 
would not normally do. (PSI, p.3.) Mr. Winn requested a polygraph examination, and 
during the pre-test interview he stated that he had oral-genital contact with J.H. two or 
three times, and manual-genital contact with her five or six times, around December of 
1 All page cites to the PSI and attached documents refer to the 392-page "WINN 
psi.pdf". 
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2008. (PSI, p.3.) J.H. was about seven or eight years old at the time. (PSI, p.4.) 
Mr. Winn prepared and signed a written statement as to the oral-genital and manual-
genital contact, and then told the polygrapher that he no longer wanted to participate in 
a polygraph examination without consulting an attorney. (PSI, p.3.) 
Mr. Winn was placed under arrest by his probation officer and booked into the 
Ada County Jail. (PSI, p.3.) He was charged with one count of lewd conduct 1Nith a 
minor under sixteen, felony, in violation of I.C. § 18-1508. (R., pp.6-7.) He was also 
charged with a sentencing enhancement for prior registerable sex offense conviction 
pursuant to I.C. § 19-25208, on account of his alleged prior conviction for lewd conduct 
with a minor under sixteen, felony, in 1993. (R., pp.9-10.) Mr. Winn initially entered a 
plea of not guilty. (R., p.29.) 
Mr. Winn later entered into a plea agreement. (Tr., p.5, Ls.19-24.) Pursuant to 
the plea agreement, Mr. Winn agreed to plead guilty to amended charges of one count 
of sexual abuse of a child under the age of sixteen years, felony, in violation of 
I.C. § 18-1506. (R., pp.57-58; Tr., p.8, Ls.6-9.) The State agreed to dismiss the 
sentencing enhancement. (Tr., p.8, Ls.9-10.) Thus, Mr. Winn entered an Alford plea2 to 
the amended charges. (R., p. 59; Tr., p.7, Ls.17-21.) Mr. Winn indicated that he had a 
fuzzy memory of what happened, because he was using methamphetamine at the time. 
(Tr., p.13, Ls.13-22.) The district court accepted Mr. Winn's guilty plea. (R., p.59.) 
Mr. Winn subsequently filed a Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea. (R., p.72.) He 
based the motion to withdraw guilty plea on additional information, disclosed by his 
family members after the plea, that allegations about M.H. abusing J.H. started in 
2 See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970). 
2 
2006.3 (Tr., p.25, Ls.9-14.) The district court did not find just cause to allow the 
withdrawal of the guilty plea, and dismissed the motion. (R., p.74; Tr., p.26, Ls.11-14.) 
At the sentencing hearing, the State recommended a unified sentence of twenty-
five years, with twenty years fixed. (R., p.76, Tr., p.39, L.21 - p.40, L.1.) Mr. Winn's 
counsel recommended a five year fixed sentence followed by five to ten years 
indeterminate. (Tr., p.43, Ls. 1-3, 10-11.) The district court imposed a unified sentence 
of twenty-five years, with twelve years fixed. (R., pp.77-79; Tr., p.45, Ls.13-15.) 
Mr. Winn filed a Notice of Appeal timely from the district court's judgment of 
conviction. (R., pp.84-86.) 
Later, Mr. Winn filed an Idaho Criminal Rule 35 (hereinafter, Rule 35) Motion for 
Reduction of Sentence and for Leave. (Motion for Reduction of Sentence and for Leave 
(Oct. 22, 2012).) The district court denied the Rule 35 motion. (Order Denying Motion 
for Sentence Reduction (Jan. 2, 2013).) On appeal, Mr. V\/inn does not challenge the 
denial of his Rule 35 motion. 
3 Before the plea, Mr. Winn was aware of information about M.H. abusing J.H., but not 
that the allegations of that abuse started in 2006. (Tr., p.25, Ls.9-14.) 
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ISSUES 
1. Did the district couri abuse its discretion when it denied Mr. Winn's motion to 
withdraw his guilty plea? 
2. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it imposed a unified sentence of 
twenty-five years, with twelve years fixed, upon Mr. Winn following his plea of 
guilty? 
4 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Mr. Winn's Motion To Withdraw 
His Guilty Plea 
A. Introduction 
Mr. Winn asserts that the district court abused its discretion when it denied his 
motion to withdraw his guiity plea. "The decision to grant a motion to withdraw a guilty 
plea is left to the sound discretion of the district court, and such discretion should be 
liberally applied." State v. Arthur, 145 Idaho 219, 222 (2008). An appellate court's 
review of the denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea "is limited to determining 
whether the district court exercised sound judicial discretion as distinguished from 
arbitrary action." Id. If a defendant files the motion before sentencing, the defendant 
"need only show a 'just reason' to withdraw the plea." Id. Here, Mr. Winn filed the 
motion before sentencing, and before he learned of the content of the PSI. (See 
Tr., p.27, Ls.3-5.) Thus, he was only required to show a "just reason" to withdraw his 
guilty plea. Arthur, 145 Idaho at 222. 
Here, Mr. Winn showed a just reason to withdraw his plea, because there was 
newly discovered evidence that could plausibly have motivated a reasonable person in 
his position not to plead guilty. The State did not demonstrate that prejudice would 
result from withdrawal of the plea. Thus, Mr. Winn submits that the district court abused 
its discretion when it denied his motion to withdraw guilty plea. 
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B. Mr. Winn Showed A Just Reason To Withdraw The Plea, Because There Was 
Newly Discovered Evidence That Could Plausibly Have Motivated A Reasonable 
Person In His Position Not To Plead Guilty 
Mr. Winn asserts that he showed a just reason to withdraw his guilty plea, 
because there was newly discovered evidence that could plausibly have motivated a 
reasonable person in his position not to plead guilty. It appears that whether newly 
discovered evidence may be a just reason to permit a defendant to withdraw a guilty 
plea is a question of first impression for this Court.4 
As a preliminary matter, Mr. Winn respectfully recommends that this Court hold 
that newly discovered evidence, that could plausibly have motivated a reasonable 
person in the defendant's position not to plead guilty, is a just reason to permit the 
defendant to withdraw a guilty plea. The Ninth Circuit has ruled, under the federal "fair 
and just reason" standard for withdrawing a guilty plea before sentencing, that newly 
discovered evidence is sufficient to justify the withdrawal of a defendant's guilty plea if 
the evidence "was relevant evidence in [the defendant's] favor that could have at least 
plausibly motivated a reasonable person in [the defendant's] position not to have pied 
guilty had he known about the evidence prior to pleading." United States v. Garcia, 401 
F.3d 1008, 1011-12 (9th Cir. 2005). 
While the Ninth Circuit's decision in Garcia is not binding on this Court, Mr. Winn 
respectfully recommends that this Court adopt its reasoning. The federal standard for 
withdrawing a guilty plea before sentencing is nearly identical to the Idaho standard. 
4 Cf State v. Hocker, 115 Idaho 137, 139 n.2 (Ct. App. 1988) (determining that a 
defense counsel's "vague allusion" to newly discovered evidence, without any 
description of the evidence, was insufficient to show a just reason for withdrawing a 
defendant's guilty plea). However, the Idaho Court of Appeals in Hocker stated that it 
"did not suggest that newly discovered evidence never can be an adequate ground to 
withdraw a plea. We simply hold that the nature of the evidence, and its potential 
relevance to this case, were not sufficiently established on the record." Id. 
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Under the federal standard, "[a] defendant may withdraw a guilty plea after its 
acceptance but before sentencing if the defendant shows 'a fair and just reason for 
requesting the withdrawal."' Id. (quoting Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (d)(2)(B)). Under the Idaho 
standard, "when the motion is made before sentencing, a defendant need only show a 
'just reason' to withdraw the plea." Arthur, 145 Idaho at 222 (quoting I.C.R. 33(c); 
State v. Ballard, 114 Idaho 799, 801 (1988)). 
Additionally, both the federal and Idaho cases on the subject declare that a 
district court should liberally apply its discretion to grant a motion to withdraw guilty plea. 
E.g., Garcia, 40·1 F.3d at 1011 ("[T]he fair and just reason standard is applied liberally." 
(internal quotation marks omitted)); Arthur, 145 Idaho at 222 ("[SJuch discretion should 
be liberally applied.") It appears that the Ninth Circuit adopted newly discovered 
evidence as a "just and fair reason" for withdrawing a guilty plea with this liberal 
discretion in mind. See United States v. Rios-Ortiz, 830 F.2d 1067, 1069 (9th Cir. 1987) 
(stating that the "fair and just reason" standard "is a more lenient test than that applied 
on post-sentencing review," and that "newly discovered evidence" is a possible "reason 
for withdrawing [a defendant's] plea that did not exist when he pleaded guilty"). Idaho's 
standard demands a similarly liberal discretion. Thus, Mr. Winn respectfully 
recommends that this Court hold that newly discovered evidence, that could plausibly 
have motivated a reasonable person in the defendant's position not to plead guilty, is a 
just reason to permit the defendant to withdraw a guilty plea. 
In this case, there was newly discovered evidence that could plausibly have 
motivated a reasonable person in Mr. Winn's position not to plead guilty. At the motion 
to withdraw guilty plea hearing, Mr. Winn's counsel told the district court that Mr. Winn 
had "indicated that post plea, he received some additional information from family 
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members that he was not privy to prior that he thinks would affect the state's case." 
(Tr., p.20, Ls.3-6.) Mr. Winn's counsel later elaborated: 'They did disclose additional 
information about [M.H.] abusing the same victim, and that was prior to plea. But in 
conversations he has had with family members, his understanding is that these 
allegations basically started in 2006." (Tr., p.25, Ls.9-14.) Mr. Winn's counsel stated 
that Mr. Winn "believes . . . that that information changes the state's case in some 
regard, and he maintains his innocence and therefore he would like to proceed to trial." 
(Tr., p.25, Ls.15-18.) 
The additional information could plausibly have motivated a reasonable person in 
Mr. Winn's position not to plead guilty. Unlike with the "vague allusion" to newly 
discovered evidence in Hocker, 115 Idaho at 139 n.2, the nature of this newly 
discovered evidence and its potential relevance were sufficiently established in this 
case. The additional information that the allegations about M.H. abusing J.H. started in 
2006 raises new questions about Mr. Winn's involvement in the abuse. Mr. Winn had a 
fuzzy memory concerning the abuse at issue here (Tr., p.13, Ls.13-22), and the 
additional information from his family member that the allegations about M.H abusing 
J.H. started in 2006-some two years before the 2008 abuse at issue here-suggests 
that there could have been an alternate perpetrator. If a reasonable person in 
Mr. Winn's position had known about this additional information, it could have plausibly 
motivated him not to plead guilty. As Mr. Winn's counsel put it, Mr. Winn believed "that 
that information changes the state's case in some regard, and he maintains his 
innocence and therefore would like to proceed to trial." (Tr., p.25, Ls.15-18.) Thus, the 
additional information, as newly discovered evidence, was a just reason to permit 
8 
Mr. Winn to withdraw his guilty plea. In sum, Mr. Winn showed a just reason to 
withdraw the plea. 
C. The State Did Not Demonstrate That Prejudice V\/ould Result From The 
Withdrawal Of Mr. Winn's Plea 
Once a defendant has shown a just reason for withdrawing a guilty plea, "the 
state may avoid the granting of the motion by demonstrating that prejudice would result 
from withdrawal of the plea." State v. Dopp, 124 Idaho 481, 485 (1993) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). Here, the State did not demonstrate that prejudice would 
result from the withdrawal of Mr. Winn's plea. At the motion to withdraw guilty plea 
hearing, the State only argued that Mr. Winn had not shown a just reason to withdraw 
his guilty plea. (See Tr., p.21, L.14 - p.24, L.17.) Additionally, Mr. Winn's counsel 
stated: "I don't see any prejudice to the state in having the plea withdrawn." (Tr., p.25, 
Ls.8-9.) Because the State did not demonstrate that prejudice would result from the 
withdrawal of Mr. Winn's plea, it may not avoid the granting of the motion to withdraw 
guilty plea. 
Mr. Winn showed a just reason to withdraw his guilty plea, because there was 
newly discovered evidence that could plausibly have motivated a reasonable person in 
Mr. Winn's position not to plead guilty. The State did not demonstrate that prejudice 
would result from the withdrawal of the plea. Thus, the district court abused its 
discretion when it denied Mr. Winn's motion to withdraw guilty plea. His case must be 
remanded so that he may withdraw his plea. 
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11. 
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Im osed A Unified Sentence Of 
Twen -five Years With Twelve Years Fixed U on Mr. Winn Followin His Plea Of 
Guilty 
A. Introduction 
Mr. Winn asserts that the district court abused its discretion when it imposed a 
unified sentence of twenty-five years, with twelve years fixed, because the sentence, 
considering any view of the facts, is excessive. Where a defendant contends that the 
sentencing court imposed an excessively harsh sentence, the appellate court will 
conduct an independent review of the record, giving consideration to the nature of the 
offense, the character of the offender, and the protection of the public interest. See 
State v. Reinke, 103 Idaho 771 (Ct. App. 1982). 
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that, "'[w]here a sentence is within statutory 
limits, an appellant has the burden of showing a clear abuse of discretion on the part of 
the court imposing the sentence."' State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294 (1997) 
(quoting State v. Cotton, 100 Idaho 573, 577 (1979)). Mr. Winn does not allege that his 
sentences exceed the statutory maximum. Accordingly, in order to show an abuse of 
discretion, Mr. Winn must show that in light of the governing criteria, the sentence is 
excessive considering any view of the facts. Id. The governing criteria or objectives of 
criminal punishment are: (1) protection of society; (2) deterrence of the individual and 
the public generally; (3) the possibility of rehabilitation; and (4) punishment or retribution 
for wrongdoing. Id. Mr. Winn asserts that his sentence is excessive considering any 
view of the facts. 
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B. Mr. Winn's Sentence Is Excessive Considering Any View Of The Facts 
Mr. Winn submits that, because the district court did not give proper 
consideration to mitigating factors, the sentence imposed by the district court is 
excessive considering any view of the facts. Specifically, the district court did not 
adequately consider Mr. Winn's substance abuse problems. The Idaho Supreme Court 
has recognized substance abuse as a mitigating factor in cases where it found a 
sentence to be excessive. See, e.g., State v. Nice, 103 Idaho 89, 91 (1982). 
Mr. Winn started using methamphetamine when he was twenty-two years old. 
(PSI, p.16.) He reported using methamphetamine up until the time he was arrested in 
this case. (PSI, p.16.) According to his GAIN-I Recommendation and Referral 
Summary (GRRS), Mr. Winn "self-reported symptoms sufficient to meet criteria for 
amphetamine dependence with physiological symptoms." (PSI, p.77.) The GRRS 
diagnosed him with "304.40 Amphetamine Dependence w/ Physiological Sx. - In a 
Controlled Environment." (PSI, p.76.) Further, Mr. Winn stated that his 
methamphetamine use has led to memory lapses. (PSI, p.3.) The district court did not 
adequately consider Mr. Winn's substance abuse problems. 
Additionally, the district court did not adequately consider Mr. Winn's goal of 
getting treatment. According to the PSI, Mr. Winn, when asked what was important to 
him, responded that "I would like to try to change my living habit." (PSI, p.16.) If 
granted probation, Mr. Winn wanted to "go for treatment for my drug trouble." (PSI, 
p.16.) At the sentencing hearing, Mr. Winn's counsel stated that Mr. Winn's "goal now 
is to get into the substance abuse programming and follow through with more sex abuse 
programming, and hopefully get himself into a position where the Department of 
Corrections will look at him and say, 'Hey, we can let you out."' (Tr., p.42, Ls.16-21.) 
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Thus, Mr. Winn's counsel recommended a fixed sentence of five years for Mr. Winn, 
because "that puts him another five years with an opportunity to do programming before 
he is eligible for release." Mr. Winn's counsel stated that "assuming [Mr. Winn] gets to 
drug treatment and can stay sober, assuming he follows up with the sex offender 
treatment, I think he can be released into the community and can be reasonably 
assured that he'll be safe to the community." (Tr., p.42, Ls.2-7.) However, the district 
court did not adequately consider Mr. Winn's goal of getting treatment. 
Because the district court did not give proper consideration to the above 
mitigating factors, the sentence imposed by the district court is excessive considering 
any view of the facts. Thus, the district court abused its discretion when it imposed the 
sentence. Mr. Winn's case must be remanded with instructions to the district court to 
reduce his sentence. 
CONCLUSION 
For the above reasons, Mr. Winn respectfully requests that this Court vacate his 
conviction and remand his case for further proceedings. Alternatively, he respectfully 
requests that this Court reduce his sentence as it deems appropriate. 
DATED this 6th day of February, 2013. 
BEN PATRICK MCGREEVY 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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